Press-Pass
Freedom/censorship/government tentacles
Monday, May 28, 2012
RFID
students are being tracked
Thursday, April 5, 2012
profit from wiretaps
Andy Greenberg, Forbes Staff
Covering the worlds of data security, privacy and hacker culture.
SECURITY | 4/03/2012 @ 3:01PM |43,224 views
These Are The Prices AT&T, Verizon and Sprint Charge For Cellphone Wiretaps
If Americans aren’t disturbed by phone carriers’ practices of handing over cell phone users’ personal data to law enforcement en masse–in many cases without a warrant–we might at least be interested to learn just how much that service is costing us in tax dollars: often hundreds or thousands per individual snooped.
Earlier this week the American Civil Liberties Union revealed a trove of documents it had obtained through Freedom of Information Requests to more than 200 police departments around the country. They show a pattern of police tracking cell phone locations and gathering other data like call logs without warrants, using devices that impersonate cell towers to intercept cellular signals, and encouraging officers to refrain from speaking about cell-tracking technology to the public, all detailed in a New York Times story.
But at least one document also details the day-to-day business of telecoms’ handing over of data to law enforcement, including a breakdown of every major carrier’s fees for every sort of data request from targeted wiretaps to so-called “tower dumps” that provide information on every user of certain cell tower. The guide, as provided by the Tucson, Arizona police department to the ACLU, is dated July 2009, and the fees it lists may be somewhat outdated. But representatives I reached by email at Verizon and AT&T both declined to detail any changes to the numbers.
Here are a few of the highlights from the fee data.
Wiretaps cost hundreds of dollars per target every month, generally paid at daily or monthly rates. To wiretap a customer’s phone, T-Mobile charges law enforcement a flat fee of $500 per target. Sprint’s wireless carrier Sprint Nextel requires police pay $400 per “market area” and per “technology” as well as a $10 per day fee, capped at $2,000. AT&T charges a $325 activation fee, plus $5 per day for data and $10 for audio. Verizon charges a $50 administrative fee plus $700 per month, per target.
Data requests for voicemail or text messages cost extra. AT&T demands $150 for access to a target’s voicemail, while Verizon charges $50 for access to text messages. Sprint offers the most detailed breakdown of fees for various kinds of data on a phone, asking $120 for pictures or video, $60 for email, $60 for voice mail and $30 for text messages.
All four telecom firms also offer so-called “tower dumps” that allow police to see the numbers of every user accessing a certain cell tower over a certain time at an hourly rate. AT&T charges $75 per tower per hour, with a minimum of two hours. Verizon charges between $30 and $60 per hour for each cell tower. T-Mobile demands $150 per cell tower per hour, and Sprint charges $50 per tower, seemingly without an hourly rate.
For location data, the carrier firms offer automated tools that let police track suspects in real time. Sprint charges $30 per month per target to use its L-Site program for location tracking. AT&T’s E911 tool costs $100 to activate and then $25 a day. T-Mobile charges a much pricier $100 per day.
Here's How Law Enforcement Cracks Your iPhone's Security Code (Video)
Andy Greenberg
Forbes Staff
NSA's New Data Center And Supercomputer Aim To Crack World's Strongest Encryption
Andy Greenberg
Forbes Staff
In an emailed statement to me, a Verizon spokesperson told me that the company doesn’t charge police in “emergency cases, nor do we charge law enforcement for historical location information in non-emergency cases.” He added that the company doesn’t “make a profit from any of the data requests from law enforcement.” A Sprint spokesperson sent me a statement saying that the company similarly doesn’t charge law enforcement for data requests in “exigent circumstances.”
“Fees are charged to law enforcement in other circumstances such as court ordered requests and it’s important to note that any fee charged is for recovery of cost required to support these law enforcement requests 24/7,” she writes.
T-Mobile declined to comment, and an AT&T spokesperson referred me to the company’s privacy policy, pointing out a specific line that reads, “We do not sell your personal information to anyone for any purpose. Period.”
That claim is “simply misleading,” says Catherine Crump, an attorney with the ACLU who coordinated the group’s FOIA project. “That’s a curious definition of ‘sell,’ given that they seem to be charging money for people’s information on a regular basis and handing it over to law enforcement agencies around the country.”
I’ve embedded the Tucson police department document below. The ACLU has created a summary of the very large collection of data it’s obtained here, and the full collection can be found here.
forget ur right to privacy
SECURITY | 3/16/2012 @ 4:23PM |9,043 views
NSA's New Data Center And Supercomputer Aim To Crack World's Strongest Encryption
Andy Greenberg, Forbes Staff
Covering the worlds of data security, privacy and hacker culture.
James Bamford has a way of digging up the facts that lend credence to America’s worst privacy fears about its own government. Now the author and investigative reporter who wrote the definitive portraits of the National Security Agency in his books The Puzzle Palace, Body of Secrets and The Shadow Factory has drawn a picture of ubiquitous surveillance that seems mind-boggling even by NSA standards.
In his just-published cover story for Wired, Bamford lays out the NSA’s plans for a vast new facility in Bluffdale, Utah that aims to become a storage and analysis hub for the record-breakingly massive collections of Internet traffic data that the NSA hopes to gather in coming years not from just foreign networks, but domestic ones as well.
The story adds confirmation to what the New York Times revealed in 2005: that the NSA has engaged in widespread wiretapping of Americans with the consent of firms like AT&T and Verizon. But more interestingly–and more troubling in the eyes of many who value their privacy–it details the Agency’s plans to crack AES encryption, the cryptographic standard certified by the NSA itself in 2009 for military and government use and until now considered uncrackable in any amount of time relevant to mortals.
Using what will likely be the world’s fastest supercomputer and the world’s largest data storage and analysis facility, the NSA plans to comb unimaginably voluminous troves of messages for patterns they could use to crack AES and weaker encryption schemes, according to Bamford’s story. A few of the facts he’s uncovered:
The $2 billion data center being built in Utah would have four 25,000 square-foot halls filled with servers, as well as another 900,000 square feet for administration.
It will use 65 megawatts of electricity a year, with an annual bill of $40 million, and incorporates a $10 million security system.
Since 2001, the NSA has intercepted and stored between 15 and 20 trillion messages, according to the estimate of ex-NSA scientist Bill Binney. It now aims to store yottabytes of data. A yottabyte is a million billions of gigabytes. According to one storage firm’s estimate in 2009, a yottabyte would cover the entire states of Rhode Island and Delaware with data centers.
When the Department of Energy began a supercomputing project in 2004 that took the title of the world’s fastest known computer from IBM in 2009 with its “Jaguar” system, it simultaneously created a secret track for the same program focused on cracking codes. The project took place in a $41 million, 214,000 square foot building at Oak Ridge National Lab with 318 scientists and other staff. The supercomputer produced there was faster than the so-called “world’s fastest” Jaguar.
The NSA project now aims to break the “exaflop barrier” by building a supercomputer a hundred times faster than the fastest existing today, the Japanese “K Computer.” That code-breaking system is projected to use 200 megawatts of power, about as much as would power 200,000 homes.
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
THREAT LEVEL
warning if the technology is abused in the middle east and the same technology is available here what makes anybody think it cannot/ will not/ nor is not/ happening here.
what were the inventors thinking when they invented the stuff to do this!!creepy slimy stalker spies leapt out from the comic books into real life people,straight from sci-fi into your pocket.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
wake up
New Yorker Sheds New Light on NSA’s Warrantless Wiretapping and Data Mining
- By Kim Zetter
- May 16, 2011 |
- 5:37 pm |
- Categories: Crime, NSA, Surveillance

New details about the NSA’s post–Sept. 11 domestic surveillance programs have emerged in a stunningNew Yorker article about NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake, who faces trial next month for allegedly leaking information about waste and mismanagement at the agency.
The article provides new insight into the warrantless surveillance program exposed by The New York Times in December 2005, including how top officials at the intelligence agency viewed the program. Former NSA Director Michael Hayden, in 2002, reportedly urged a congressional staffer who was concerned about the legality of the program to keep quiet about it, telling her that she could “yell and scream” about the program once the inevitable leaks about it occurred.
Asked why the NSA didn’t employ privacy protections in its program, Hayden reportedly told the staffer, “We didn’t need them. We had the power,” and admitted the government was not getting warrants for the domestic surveillance.
The New Yorker also spoke with a former head of the agency’s Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center, or SARC, who invented software codenamed ThinThread that is believed to have been adapted by the NSA for the warrantless surveillance. The program had privacy protections built into it, but the official says he believes the NSA rejiggered the program to remove those protections, so that it could collect data on everyone, including people in the United States.
Thomas Drake, the focus of the article, is facing trial next month on charges that he violated the Espionage Act by retaining classified information. Ironically, he’s not being charged for leaking classified information about the warrantless wiretapping program itself. Instead, the charges are based on five documents government investigators found in Drake’s basement and e-mail archive that prosecutors say contain classified information.
The documents discuss another data-mining program dubbed Trailblazer that was deemed a failure and canceled before it was implemented. Drake allegedly provided information about waste and mismanagement of the Trailblazer program to a reporter at the Baltimore Sun in 2006 and 2007, but he maintains that he gave the reporter no classified information and disputes that the documents found in his possession contain classified material.
Drake, who left the NSA in 2008 and now works at an Apple Store outside Washington, D.C., is facing a possible sentence of 35 years if convicted. The government’s decision to prosecute him is now resulting in further information about the NSA’s illegal surveillance being exposed, as the New Yorker article shows.
Drake was a linguist and military crypto expert who had been an NSA contractor when he began a new staff job with the agency on the fateful morning of September 11, 2001, in the agency’s Signals Intelligence Directorate.
As a contractor, Drake had become familiar with a data-mining program codenamed ThinThread, that had been tested within the NSA and could be deployed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions where terrorism was prevalent. After 9/11, the program seemed ideal to address the suddenly urgent need to track down terrorist targets.
The program was created in the late ’90s by Bill Binney, a mathematician and head of the NSA’s SARC unit. It was designed to trap, map and mine vast amounts of data in real time to pick out relevant and suspicions communications, rather than requiring the data to be stored and sifted later. The New Yorkerdetails it:
As Binney imagined it, ThinThread would correlate data from financial transactions, travel records, Web searches,GPS equipment, and any other “attributes” that an analyst might find useful in pinpointing “the bad guys.” By 2000, Binney, using fibre optics, had set up a computer network that could chart relationships among people in real time. It also turned the N.S.A.’s data-collection paradigm upside down. Instead of vacuuming up information around the world and then sending it all back to headquarters for analysis, ThinThread processed information as it was collected—discarding useless information on the spot and avoiding the overload problem that plagued centralized systems. Binney says, “The beauty of it is that it was open-ended, so it could keep expanding.”
The program was “nearly perfect” except for one thing. It swooped up the data of Americans as well as foreigners and continued to intercept foreign communications as they traversed U.S.-based switches and networks. This violated U.S. law, which forbids the collection of domestic communication without a probable-cause warrant.
To solve this problem, Binney added privacy controls and an “anonymizing feature” to encrypt all American communications that ThinThread processed. The system would flag patterns that looked suspicious, which authorities could then use to obtain a warrant and decrypt the information.
ThinThread was ready to deploy in early 2001, but the NSA’s lawyers determined it violated Americans’ privacy, and NSA director Michael Hayden scrapped it. In its place, Hayden focused funding on a different program, codenamed Trailblazer, which the NSA contracted with outside defense companies, like SAIC, to produce.
That system ran into numerous problems and cost overruns, yet continued with Hayden’s support. Hayden’s deputy director and his chief of signals-intelligence programs worked at various times for SAIC, which received several Trailblazer contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2006, after eating up some $1.2 billion, Trailblazer was finally deemed a flop and killed.
But in the meantime, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, rumors began circulating within the NSA that the agency, with the approval of the White House, was violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by conducting domestic surveillance. On Oct. 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the policy, which was operational by Oct. 6.
Drake said strange things began happening inside the NSA, with equipment suddenly being moved, and people who worked on FISA warrants being re-assigned. Drake saw this as a tipoff that the conventional legal surveillance process was being circumvented.
Binney, who wasn’t involved directly in the post-9/11 surveillance program, was certain that the rumored surveillance must be using components of the ThinThread program he helped design, but with the privacy protections now stripped out of it.
“It was my brainchild,” he told The New Yorker. “But they removed the protections, the anonymization process. When you remove that, you can target anyone.”
NSA people who were apprised of the program told him, “Can you believe they’re doing this? They’re getting billing records on U.S. citizens! They’re putting pen registers on everyone in the country!”
Drake heard from colleagues that the surveillance involved special “arrangements” that were being made with telecom and credit card companies to collect data on customers. Drake says he tried to raise concerns about the legality of the program with the NSA’s general counsel but was told not to worry about it, that it was legal and none of his business.
“The mantra was ‘Get the data!’” he told The New Yorker.
He discussed the issue with Maureen Baginski, his superior at the NSA and the third-highest-ranking official in the agency. She reportedly told him presciently that she feared the NSA would be “haunted” by the surveillance program. She left the agency in 2003 in part because she was uncomfortable with the program, The New Yorker reports.
Drake also confided in Diane Roark, a staff member on the House Intelligence Committee. She wrote a series of memos in February 2002 warning of the potential legal violations and gave them to Intelligence Committee staffers who worked for committee chairman Porter Goss and Democratic minority Whip Nancy Pelosi. But nothing happened.
Instead, Roark drew the wrath of Hayden who pleaded with her to stop agitating against the program and seemed to suggest to Roark he had assurances that the Supreme Court would back the program.The New Yorker:
He conceded that the policy would leak at some point, and told her that when it did she could “yell and scream” as much as she wished. Meanwhile, he wanted to give the program more time. She asked Hayden why the N.S.A. had chosen not to include privacy protections for Americans. She says that he “kept not answering. Finally, he mumbled, and looked down, and said, ‘We didn’t need them. We had the power.’ He didn’t even look me in the eye. I was flabbergasted.” She asked him directly if the government was getting warrants for domestic surveillance, and he admitted that it was not.
Roark tried to contact Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist but got no response. When she contacted a judge on the FISA court to express concern that the NSA and government were doing an end-run around the court, she was referred to the Justice Department, which had approved the surveillance program in the first place.
“This was such a Catch-22,” Roark told The New Yorker. “There was no one to go to.”
Read the New Yorker story for more information.
Image: NSA.gov
Kim Zetter is a senior reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, security and civil liberties.Follow @KimZetter on Twitter.
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